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ABSTRACT
The growth of the U.S. economy over the nineteenth century was characterized by a sharp
acceleration in the rate of inventive activity and a dramatic rise in the relative importance of highly
specialized inventors as generators of new technological knowledge. Relying on evidence compiled
from patent records, we argue that the evolution of a market for technology played a central role
in these developments. Across both individuals and geographic areas, the expansion of
opportunities to trade in patent rights was closely associated with increases in specialization at
invention, as well as advances in rates of invention more generally. The patent system is often
celebrated for the stimulus to invention provided by granting limited monopoly rights to inventors
for the use of their discoveries, but its specification of tradable assets in technology has also been
important.
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lamoreaux@econ.ucla.edu sokoloff@ucla.eduOne of the fundamental processes of economic development is the evolution of
ever more articulated markets that lower transactions costs, permit commodities to be
traded over longer distances, and encourage greater specialization by productive
resources. The importance of the phenomenon is evident in the extensive attention
economists have long devoted to the changes in the operation and structure of markets for
labor, capital, and products over time. There has to date, however, been only limited
examination of the market for technology. Given the significance for economic growth of
the generation of new technologies, and the recognition that inventive activity is not unlike
other investments in being responsive to material returns, systematic investigation of how
trade in technological information has been carried out is long overdue. Although the
reasons for this neglect are not entirely clear, the study of the market for technology has
perhaps been inhibited by notions that problems of asymmetric information make
contracting for technology in the market very difficult and costly, and that there are
substantial advantages to inventive activity being conducted within the same firms that
would commercially exploit the new knowledge. These largely theoretical conceptions
may have encouraged the impression that the scopefor market exchange of technological
information is quite narrow.
Although the idea that new technologies are typically produced within those firms
that commercially exploit the discoveries may seem very reasonable in a context where
large-scale R & D laboratories are common, this condition has not always held. The
United States economy was characterized by high rates of invention and technological
change over most of the nineteenth century —wellbefore the widespread organization of2
thesesorts of in-house facilities.' One indicator of this is the record of patenting, which
began to grow very rapidly soon a1er the major reform of the patent law in1836. Per
capita rates more than doubled during the 1840s, the 1850s, as well as duringthe 1860s.
From fewer than 30 patents per million residents of the United States per year during the
1 840s, the rate rose to over 300 by the early 1 870s, and peaked just above 360 in the early
1890s (see Table 1).2Amongthe tens of thousands of patents granted over the nineteenth
and early twentieth century period were those of Cyrus McCormick, who obtained patents
for a reaper and other farm equipment; Gail Borden, who obtained patents for the
concentrating and preserving of milk and other foods; Thomas Edison, who obtained patents
for the incandescent light bulb, the phonograph, and motion pictures; Alexander Graham
Bell, who patented the telephone; the Wright Brothers, who flew the first airplane;Nicholas
Tesla, who worked out a system for transmitting electric power; and Lee de Forest, Reginald
Fessenden, and others, who developed the technology for radio.
Despite the obvious importance of many of the new technologies discovered,
scholars have seldom asked whether this enormous wave of creativity is consistent with
the conventional paradigm of where significant inventions emanate from, or sought to
For an overview of the growth of in-house R&D, see David C. Mowery, "Industrial Research
and Firm Size, Survival, and Growth in American Manufacturing, 192 1-1946: An Assessment," Journal
of Economic History, 43 (Dec. 1983), PP. 953-80; and Mowery and Nathan Rosenberg, Technologyand
the Pursuit of Economic Growth (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 3 5-97. For specific
examples, see Margaret B. W. Graham and Bettye H. Pruitt, R&D for Industry: A Century ofTechnical
Innovation at Alcoa (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); David A. Hounshell and John Kenly
Smith, Jr., Science and Corporate Strategy: Du Pont R&D, /902-1980 (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1988); Leonard S. Reich, The Making of American Industrial Research: Science and
Business at GE and Bell, 1876-I 926 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985); and George Wise,
Willis R. Whitney, General Electric, and the Origins of US. Industrial Research (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1985).
2
Althoughthe patenting rate has occasionally blipped up to surpass the peak of the early 1890s,
this ceiling has essentially endured until very recently.
See Thomas P. Hughes, American Genesis: A Century of Invention and Technological
Enthusiasm, 1870-1970 (New York: Penguin, 1989), pp. 13-52.3
identify the conditions that made this period such a productive one for independent
inventors. Rather they have preferred to highlight developments that were unlikely to
have been major factors until the twentieth century: the rise of large-scale business
organizations and their founding of the in-house R & D laboratories in particular. In
contrast, our focus is on the evolution of institutions over the nineteenth century that
made it easier to trade in the rights to patented inventions —essentiallya market for
patented technologies. There is, in our view, good reason to believe that it was the
expanded opportunities to trade in the rights to patented technologies that enabled the
independent inventors of this golden age to flourish, and that stimulated the growth of
inventive activity more generally. Early nineteenth-century inventors generally took
personal responsibility for the commercial development of their ideas, making it difficult
for them to focus exclusively on the generation of new technologies.4 As institutions
emerged to facilitate the sale or transfer of patent rights to other individuals or firms
better positioned to commercially exploit them, however, many inventors increasingly
took advantage of this avenue for extracting the returns to their efforts and concentrated
on inventive activity. In other words, the growth of market trade in patents raised the
returns to invention generally, and encouraged a division of labor whereby technologically
creative individuals increasingly specialized in their comparative advantage --invention.
We argue that the patent system was central to the evolution of this market for
technology, and suggest that the stimulus to invention provided by the patent system
through its facilitation of trade in patented technological information has not always been
"See B. Zorma Khan and Kenneth L. Sokoloff, "Schemesof Practical Utility': Entrepreneurship
and Innovation Among 'Great Inventors' in the United States, 1790-1865," Journal of Economic Histo.'y,
53 (June 1993), pp. 289-3 07.4
fullyappreciated. Throughout the paper, we employ patent records to explore and
establish the empirical association over the nineteenth century between the opportunities
to trade patent rights and both specialization at invention by individuals and levels of
inventive activity more generally. In addition to this quantitative evidence, we also draw
on anecdotal information, including archival records of patent lawyers, to illustrate some
of the mechanisms through which trade in patented technology was conducted. It is
evident that patent agents and lawyers often performed the functions of intermediaries in
the market for technology, matching inventors seeking to sell new technological ideas with
buyers eager to develop, commercialize, or invest in them. As we note, the local
character of this sort of trade in technological information may shed light on the
persistence of some geographic differentials in invention. Patent agents, attorneys, and
other intermediaries in this market concentrated first in areas or regions where inventive
activity had been high, such as in the Northeast and urban centers generally, and this may
have contributed to a self-reinforcing process or cycle whereby the early clustering of
patenting activity encouraged investments supporting a market for technology (such as the
establishment of patent agencies) ,whichin turn stimulated greater specialization and
productivity in invention, and so on.
We also use a sample drawn from the Patent Office's manuscript records of patent
sales to examine more directly the emergence of intermediaries who were relatively
specialized in this market for technology, and the characteristics of those inventors who
dealt with such agents. The fmdings that the more specialized inventors tended
disproportionately to deal with the more specialized intermediaries, and vice versa, are
consistent with our view that the growth of the market for technology and higher levels ofinvention, and especially specialization at invention, were mutually reinforcing and
developed together. It is well known that, in the case of financial markets, the
development of intermediaries not only solved the information problems associated with
matching those seeking investment capital with whose who had savings, but also raised the
levels of savings and investment in the economy. Our goal is to assess the extent to which
the emergence of intermediaries in the market for technology had the analogous effect of
boosting rates of invention and technological change.
II
The U.S. patent system was created in accordance with the Commerce Clause of
the Constitution "to promote the progress of science and useful arts by securing to authors
and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries," and it
provided the institutional framework within which trade in technology evolved over the
course of the nineteenth century.5 Although similar in general structure to that in Britain,
the U.S. laws made a few salient innovations, which seem consciously directed at
stimulating inventive activity —andthus technological progress. Among them were much
lower registration fees, impersonal administrative procedures for handling applications,
and the reservation for only the "first and true" inventor an exclusive property right to the
new technology for a fixed term of years. These provisions extended the incentive of
property rights to a broad range of inventors and inventions, and meant that inventors
could reveal information about their devices and still be protected against the possibility
that someone else would directly exploit their ideas without compensation. Another
United States Constitution, Article 1, section 8, clause 8.6
important feature of the law was the requirement that patentees be individual men or
women; firms could not receive patents directly for inventions developed in their shops.
These individual patentees then had the option of exploiting their property rights
themselves, or they could sell (assign) or lease (license) them to others, whether
individuals or firms. Of course, the ability of patentees to fmd buyers or licensees for their
patents depended on the security of these property rights. Responsibility for enforcing
patent rights was left to the federal courts, and judges quickly evolved an effective setof
principles for protecting the rights of patentees and also of those who purchased or
licensed patented technologies. As a result, not only did thousands of inventors pay rather
substantial fees to obtain patents, but large numbers of individuals and firms paid even
greater amounts to purchase or license patent rights.6
Although one purpose of the patent system was to stimulate invention by granting
creative individuals secure rights to their intellectual property, another was to promote the
diffusion of technological knowledge. One way in which the law stimulated such diffusion
was through public disclosure; all patentees were required to provide the Patent Office
with detailed specifications for their inventions, and the result was a central storehouse of
technological information that was open to all. Anyone could research others' inventions
in the Patent Office files, and more convenient means of tapping this resource were soon
developed. The Patent Office itself published periodic lists of patents awarded, and
private journals, many of them owned by the leading patent agencies of the day, emerged
6SeeB. Zorina Khan and Kenneth L. Sokoloff, "Patent Institutions, Industrial Organization and
Early Technological Change: Britain and the United States, 1790-1850," in Technological Revolutions in
Europe: Historical Perspectives, ed. Maxine Berg and Kristine Bruland (Cheltenham, UK: Edward
Elgar, 1998); and Khan, "Property Rights and Patent Litigation in Early Nineteenth-Century America,"
Journal of Economic History, 55 (Mar. 1995), PP. 58-97.7
to improve upon this service. One of the most important was Scientific American,
established in the 1 840s and published by Munn and Company, the largest patent agency
of the nineteenth century. Others included the American Artisan, published by Brown,
Coombs & Company; the American Inventor, by the American Patent Agency; and the
Patent Rights Gazette, by the United States Patent Right Association (which, despite its
name, functioned as a general patent agency). Serving national readerships,these journals
featured articles about major technological improvements, printed complete lists of patents
issued (often on a weekly basis), and offered to provide readers with copies of full patent
specifications for a small fee. They also included a variety of advertisements that
disseminated information about inventions (or how to profit from them), placed by patent
agents and lawyers soliciting clients, detective agencies specializing in patent issues,
inventors seeking partners with capital to invest, patentees hoping to sell or license rights
to their technologies, and producers of patented products trying to increase theirsales.7
Of course this intense interest by a broad spectrum of private parties in patented or
patentable inventions (and their marketing) reflects a fundamental, if indirect, way in
which the framers of the patent system sought to improve the spread of technology.
From the very first patent law of 1790, there was explicit provision for the sale of patent
rights, and both the courts and the U.S. Patent Office acted to facilitate such transfers.In
doing so, the patent system not only increased the potential return to patentees, but also
encouraged the flow of the new technological information to those positioned to put it to
7Over time, specialized trade journals also emerged in industry after industry to keep producers
informed about patents of interest. The Journal of the Society of Glass Technology, for example, provided
detailed descriptions of all patents taken out in the United States and Britain that were relevant to the
manufacture of glass. For discussion of patterns of inventive activity and technological change in this8
best use. The market for technology was to work in a manner not unlike those for other
valuable assets with specified and tradable property rights.
Although patenting activity had been increasing beforehand, the pace of growth
appears to have accelerated markedly in thedecades following the Patent Act of 1836.8
With this law, the U.S. adopted the examination system in use today, whereby each
application is scrutinized by technical trained examiners to ensure thatthe invention
constituted an original advance in the state of the art, and is otherwise deserving of a
patent. This toughening of the requirements led to animmediate decrease in the numbers
granted, but the change in the system had been intended to facilitatethe enforcement of
legitimate property rights in technology by decreasing uncertaintyabout how the validity
of a patent would stand up in court. One would expect such a change to be a netstimulus
to patenting and trade in patent rights over the long run, and as suggested bythe figures in
Table 1, the most dramatic increases in the rate of patenting per capita in the historyof
the U.S. followed shortly afterward --risingmore than ten times from 1840 through
1870. Not coincidentally, the numbers of patent agents and attorneys also began to
mushroom in the late 1 830s and 1 840s, first in the vicinity of Washington and thenin
Boston and other cities of the Northeast where patenting rates were high.9 Atfirst the
primary function of patent agents and lawyers was to shepherd applicationsfor patents
industry, see Lamoreaux and Sokoloff, "Location and Technological Changein the American Glass
Industry During the late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries," unpublished manuscript,1998.
8Fora discussion of early-nineteenth century growth in rates of patenting, see Sokoloff,
"Inventive Activity in Early Industrial America: Evidence from Patent Records, 1790-1846," Journal of
Economic History, 48 (Dec. 1988), pp. 8 13-50.
Some of the largest of these firms maintained offices in several cities, but others often linked
themselves together through chains of correspondent relations (similar to those that characterized the
banking system at the same time), providing their local clients with access to agentsin Washington who
were perhaps more specialized in their knowledge and/or could directly exploitthe information in Patent9
through the official review process and to defend previouslyissued patents in interference
and infringement proceedings, but as time went on they increasinglytook on other roles in
the market for technology, including serving as intermediariesin the sale of patents.
The reasons patentees had for selling offal! or a share ofthe rights to their
discovery varied with their circumstances. Atfirst (prior to the emergence of a national
product market), most sales of patents involved separatetransfers to firms in different
geographic markets, allowing inventors to extract returns overand above those they
earned through direct commercial development in their homedistricts. Others gave shares
to partners who provided capital to support the underlyinginventive activity or the
commercial development of the invention. Finally, many soldoff their full rights to
assignees who were better positioned to developthe new technology commercially. What
is common to all of these forms of assignment was thatthe ability to trade property rights
in technological information, based on the patent law andother institutions contributing to
this market, encouraged greater specialization at inventive activity bythe inventor.
The destruction by fire of the building housing the Patent Office,also in 1836,
prevents us from studying the sales (assignments)of patents prior to the change in the law
enacted in that year. What is apparent from the surviving records, datingback to 1837,
however, is that within a few years trade in patent rightsattained a high volume relative to
the numbers of inventions patented, and that the bulkof this early commerce in patented
technologies involved attempts to obtain returnsfrom inventions across a range of
geographically distinct markets. During the 1 840s,there were many patent assignments
filed with the Patent Office for each patent granted (3 to6 times as many by our
Office files, as well as to information on conditions relevant to patentingand the market for technology10
estimates), while 80 to 90 percent of the assignments registered with the Patent Office
were "geographic". The predominance of such assignments declined (below 30 percent by
the 1 870s) as improvements in transportation extended the geographic extent of product
markets, and the ratio of assignments to patents correspondingly decreased, but the total
volume of trade —asindicated by the number of assignment contracts filed with the Patent
Office —grewrapidly over time.'° It is clear that an extensive market in patent rights
evolved alongside, if not together with, the dramatic increase in per capita patenting rates
that took place during the middle third of the nineteenth century.
As is evident from Table 2, which is based on our work with a sample of
assignment contracts from 1871, 1891, and 1911, the ratio of assignments to patents
awarded continued in a declining trend --to0.83 in 1870-71, and 0.71 in 1890-91 and
19 10-11. Much of this decrease was due to the diminishing importance of geographic
assignments, but another factor was the shift over time toward greater use of licensing of
patents in lieu of secondary assignments. Since licensing contracts were not typically
registered with the Patent Office, we suspect that a more comprehensive measure of trade
in rights to patented technologies would reveal an increase over time (rather than a
decrease) in the volume of trade in patent rights relative to the numbers of patents (or the
stock of technological knowledge under patent protection)." The fall over time in the
more generally throughout the country. '°Webenefit here from the legal requirement that all patent assignments had to be filed with the
Patent Office within three months in order to be legally binding. These characterizations and estimates are
based on the counts of the total number of assignments, and of various types of assignments, appearing in
the Digests for inventions patented by inventors whose last name began with the letter 'B'. They were
calculated from the assignments filed during January, February, and March of 1844, 1848, 1852, 1855,
1862, 1866, and 1874.
These ratios are not measures of the proportion of patents that were ever assigned, which we
cannot reliably calculate, but instead are estimates of the volume of assignment activity relative to11
relative frequency of assignments that were secondary is consistent with this
interpretation. Another secular trend manifested throughout the country was the dramatic
decline in the proportion of assignments that took place after issue, from 72.3 percent of
those concerned with patents granted to residents of the U.S in 1870-71, to 36.5percent.
in 1910-11. The patterns suggest that as the market for technology developed, patent
assignments were arranged earlier (relative to the date the patent was awarded), more
likely to transfer rights for the entire U.S., and less likely to be secondary (have assignors
other than the patentee).'2
A salient feature of the patterns of patent assignment presented in Table 2 is that
the regions with the highest ratios of assignments to patents (reported as an index, with
the national average set to 100 in each year) —NewEngland, the Middle Atlantic, and
East North Central --arealso those that had long exhibited the highest rates of patenting
per capita (see Table 1) as well as the largest proportions of patents assigned at issue
(Table 3). The results indicate, accordingly, that these regions had especially extensive
trade in patent rights on a per capita (as well as a per patent) basis, and that high rates of
patenting and trade in patented technologies tended to develop together. The variation
across regions in how quickly patent assignments occurred also points to a more rapid
development of intermediation between buyers and sellers of patents in the regions with
higher rates of patenting per capita.
patenting activity. One cannot, accordingly, infer from the fall in these ratios that the proportion of
patents ever assigned also declined after 1870-71.
12
Part,but not all, of the decline in the proportion of assignments that occurred after issue was
due to the decrease in the prevalence of secondary assignments and to the longer periods of time between
the application for, and the granting of, a patent.12
Table3 reports the proportion of patents in the cross-sectional samples that were
assigned at issue, as well as the frequency of various types of assignments, including those
going to companies. These data, drawn from the Annual Reports of the Commissioner of
Patents, are not as rich as the sample of assignment contracts in that they do not capture
information on assignments made after the issuance of the patent, but they are useful in
gauging what happened with a random set of patents. Both the total proportion of patents
assigned at issue and the fraction of assignments going to companies might reasonably be
considered measures of the extent to which the market in patented technologies had
developed, and indicate clear improvement over time. The two are correlated with each
other, and exhibit the same regional pattern as patenting per capita. New England is the
leader, with the Middle Atlantic a relatively distant second, and the East North Central
lagging a bit behind. Again, there appears to have been a strong positive association
across regions between the extent of trade in patents (on a per patent basis) and rates of
patenting per capita.
As one examines the differences in the composition of assignments across regions,
and how they change over time, the figures in Table 3 seem to suggest a systematic
progression in how the market in technology evolved. At first, inventors not only came
up with new technological ideas but also developed and commercialized them —sometimes
by applying them to their own businesses, sometimes by selling partial rights to their ideas
to producers in different geographical markets, and sometimes by doing both. As the
market for technology expanded and matured, inventors seem to have employed it to
mobilize support for their activities. For example, during the early 1 870s assignments at
issue often involved the transfers of shares of patents to groups of individuals who were13
not coinventors, but who generally resided in the vicinity of the patentee, and it is likely
that these partial assignments compensated local partners for advances of capital to
support the development and commercialization of the inventions. Over time, however,
patentees increasingly relinquished all property rights to their inventions by the time of
issue, assigning their rights in entirety to companies. These types of assignments would
seem to reflect the most pronounced movement toward specialization at invention by
patentees, and the transition to this latter phase occurred most rapidly in the regions with
historically higher rates of patenting per capita and proportions of patents assigned, such
as New England.13
The robust regional correspondence between the extent of the market in
technology and patenting should not be surprising. On one hand, investments in the
establishment of firms and institutions conducive to trade in patented technologies would
be expected to concentrate in areas where rates of invention were already high; such
There were several kinds of relationships between patentees and assignees that led to
assignments to companies. The first, one that appears to have been predominant until late in the
nineteenth century, was when an inventor assigned his patent in an arm's length transaction to a company
with which he had no long-term association. A second kind of relationship involved an inventor
assigning his patent to the firm that employed him in a long-term association. This type of relationship
between patentees and assignees seems to have accounted for only a modest proportion of all assignments
to companies through the l920s. The third kind of relationship was when an inventor assigned his patent
to a firm he was an officer or other principal of. We have found strong evidence that this sort of
relationship became more common during the early twentieth century, especially among the most
productive inventors. These types of relationships between patentees and assignees have somewhat
different implications for the degree of specialization by patentees at invention, and for the relative
importance of a market in technology in obtaining that degree of specialization. Much remains unclear
however. Of particular interest is the third type of relationship. If the patentee had originally formed the
company as a means of raising capital for supporting his inventive activity, the interpretation of an
assignment would be different than if the company had made the inventor an officer as a way of tying
him to the firm. One would also like to know whether the company was an enterprise that exploited his
inventions in the course of its many other activities, or whether it was an enterprise that was relatively
specialized at inventive activity. This latter type of firm could extract income from inventions by
licensing or selling off the rights to other firms, or through sales of products embodied with the new
technology. See Naomi R. Lamoreaux and Kenneth L. Sokoloff, "Inventors, Firms, and the Market for
Technology in the United States in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries," in Naomi R.14
locations presumably offered the best prospects for returns to participating in the market
for technology. On the other, firms and institutions conducive to trading in this market
would stimulate greater specialization and productivity at invention nearby by increasing
the net returns inventors could expect from making a given discovery (accordingly
encouraging individuals with a comparative advantage to make appropriate investments in
invention, including human capital to augment their productivity at invention) and by
making it easier for inventors to raise capital to support their inventive activity. More
developed market institutions in a city or region would also attract individuals already
inclined to specialize at invention to move to the respective location. Greater
specialization by inventors, whatever the source, would in turn stimulate more investment
in firms and institutions involved in the patent trade. Such self-reinforcing processes
between high rates of invention and the evolution of the market for technology may well
have contributed to persistent and correlated regional differences in both rates of
patenting per capita as well as of assignment of patented technologies.
Table 4, which uses the geographic distribution of patent attorneys in 1883 as a proxy
for access to the market for technology, provides ftirther support for the workings of these self-
reinforcing processes. The figures indicate that patent attorneys were overwhelmingly
concentrated in New England and the Middle Atlantic, where patenting rates had long been
much higher than elsewhere in the country. Even though less than 30 percent of the nation's
population resided in these two regions (8.0 and 20.9 percent respectively in 1880), they were
home to more than two-thirds of the patent attorneys in the U.S. outside of Washington D.C.
(exceeding their share of patents to U.S. residents as well). The impression that patent
Lamoreaux, Daniel M.G. Raff, and Peter Temin, eds., Learning By Doing in Markets, Firms, and15
attorneys and agents tended to set up their shops where large numbers of patents were
produced is further strengthened by the estimates of patenting per capita by urbanization class
within region reported in Table 5.Patentattorneys were highly concentrated in big cities,
which throughout our period generated many more patents per capita than did rural or less
urbanized areas within the same regions. Moreover, we wifi see below that trade in patents
was disproportionately conducted in big cities, not only relative to population but also relative
to the already disproportionate number of patents generated there.
Finally, another approach to exploring whether patenting activity was related to
the expansion of trade in patented technologies is to examine whether the behavior of
inventors changed in the way theory would suggest as the market for technology evolved.
Specifically, one would expect individuals with a comparative advantage in invention to
increasingly specialize in that activity, realizing the returns to their discoveries by selling
off the rights to them, and, consequently, that the patents awarded would tend increasingly
to be received by specialized inventors. In Table 6 we subject this idea to a test of
consistency with the evidence, and fmd that the share of patents awarded to inventors with
long-term commitments to patenting did indeed increase dramatically over the nineteenth
century.14 The figures indicate that a major shifi occurred, especially during the period from
the early 1 840s to 1870 when the rate of patenting per capita exploded, with the proportion of
patents awarded to individuals who received ten or more patents over their careers rising from
Countries (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1999).
14Weobtained the estimates for 1870-71, 1890-91, and 1910-11 by selecting from our three cross-
sectional samples inventors whose last names began with the letter "B" and collecting information on all the
patents these inventors received in the twenty-five years before and after they appeared in the respective sample.
We then grouped the inventors according to the total number of patents they obtained over the fifty-year period
and calculated how all the patents in each cross-section were distributed across these groups. Finally, we
compared our results with data on career patenting for the period 1790-1842 compiled by Kenneth Sokoloff and16
below 5percentin the three early cross-sections to 25percentor more in the three cross-
sections between 1870 and 1911. The early 1 800s were a democratic era of invention, when a
broad segment of the population was acquainted with the basic elements of the technology in
use, and the typical inventor accounted for only one or two patents over his or her lifetime in
the course of carrying out his trade. The rapid expansion of the market for patents that began
during the second third of the nineteenth century, however, made it easier to extract returns
from technological discoveries by selling off patent rights, and coincided with the emergence of
a class of inventors who were relatively specialized at inventive activity as well as a rise in rates
of patenting overall.
III
Thus far, we have highlighted two distinct types of aggregate or regional patterns
that are consistent with the view that the growth and general contour of inventive activity
over the mid- to late-nineteenth century was associated with the evolution of a market in
patented technologies. First, we noted how very substantial growth in patenting per capita
during the middle of the century was realized during roughly the same period that trade in
patents expanded greatly, and how these developments coincided with a dramatic increase
in the prominence of highly specialized inventors among patentees. Second, a variety of
indicators of this market in technological information were strongly correlated across
geographic areas with patenting per capita.
Although the evidence for an empirical association between inventive activity and
the development of the market for technology is impressive, the hypothesized linkage
between productivity or specialization at invention and the practice of selling off patent rights
Zorina Khan, "The Democratization of Invention During Early Industrialization: Evidence from the United17
must be explored at the level of individual inventors to gain both more confidence in and a
better understanding of the patterns in the data. In Table 7, we present three cross-sectional
regressions, estimated over the cross-sectional samples of patents from 1870-71, 1890-91, and
1910-11. The dependent variable is the log of the number of patents awarded to the patentee
in the respective two-year periods, and the independent variables include dummies for the
region in which the patentee resided, whether he resided in an urban county or a major
metropolitan center, the sector in which the patent was classified, the log of the annual rate of
patenting per capita in the patentee's home county, and a set of dummies for whether the
patent was assigned at issue and for categories of assignments. The key result is that even after
controlling for location and the sector with which the invention was concerned, patentees who
assigned their patents to companies were awarded more patents per year on average
throughout our period —ineach of the three cross-sections. Because the great majority of
assignments at issue not going to companies seem to have involved transfers of shares of the
respective patent to local partners or suppliers of capital, this finding is quite consistent with the
idea that the patentees who tended to sell off the full rights to their inventions were the most
specialized and productive at invention. The inventors who maintained a share of their patent
may not have been anymore specialized at invention than patentees who did not assign, and
indeed there was no statistically significant difference between those who assigned their
patents to individuals and those who did not relinquish the rights to their inventions until 1910-
11. By then, with technology more complex and costly to develop, patentees who lacked
partners or associations with companies, or whose inventions did not attract quick buyers,
States, 1790-1846," Journal of Economic History, 50 (June 1990), pp. 363-78.18
were probably at a serious disadvantage in maintaining major commitments to inventive
activity.
Several other results from the regressions also lend support to our argument. Most
directly, the finding that patentees residing in counties with high rates of patenting per capita,
urban counties, and in New England or the Middle Atlantic —allareas with evidence of a better
developed market for technology --filedsignificantly more patents than those located
elsewhere is consistent with our notion that the most productive inventors were attracted to
opportunities to trade the rights to their discoveries. Moreover, our view that the increasing
complexity of technology over time encouraged inventors to invest in human capital useful in
carrying out inventive activity, and to specialize accordingly, is supported by the coefficients on
the dummy variables for the sector in which the patent was intended. After controlling for
other variables, patentees in manufacturing, energy, and transportation received more patents
than those working in other sectors, and both the magnitude and statistical significance of these
differentials increased over time.
The cross-sectional regressions are interesting, but there is a question of how well
specialization or productivity at invention can be measured from information on patenting
activity in only one or two years. In order to obtain a more accurate measure, we constructed
a data set composed of the records of patenting activity over fifty years for 561 patentees. The
561 individuals consisted of all of the patentees in our randomly-selected cross-sectional
samples for 1870-71, 1890-91, and 1910-11, whose family names began with the letter 'B';
hence we refer to this as our 'B' sample.'5 We traced each of these patentees in the Annual
15Morepatentees had family names beginning with 'B' than with any other letter. On average,
they account for roughly 11% of patents filed. More information about the construction of the data set is
provided in the note to Table 6.19
Reportsof the Commissioner of Patents both back and forward twenty-five years to assemble
what we refer to as the "career" record of patenting. In total, the 561 patentees received 6057
patents over their respective "careers" of filly years, with each patent record being an
observation in the data set, and career totals and characteristics of the respective patentee
linked to each of his patents.
In Table 8, we report descriptive statistics on the "career" records of the patentees
included in this sample, for each of the particular cross-sections from which the 561 patentees
originally appeared and by whether and to whom the patent was assigned. In the upper panel
of the table, the averages of the total number of patents received by the patentee over his
career, of the number of years between his last patent and first patent, and of the proportion of
all patents received over his career that were assigned at issue, were computed over the 561
patents of the 561 patentees that were originally included in the cross-sectional samples; the
lower panel contains the statistics computed over all 6057 patents. The two sets of figures are
in a sense analogous to unweighted and weighted averages of the patentee characteristics, but
are not the same because a single patentee can have different patents counted in different
assignment categories.
The most striking and robust finding is that in all three "cohorts", patentees who
assigned their rights away at issue to companies had very different careers of inventive activity
than other groups of patentees —especiallythose who did not assign. They received many
more patents over time, were active at generating patentable inventions for a much longer
period, and assigned away a high proportion of the patents they were awarded. The stark
contrasts are evident as early as the 1870-71 cohort of patentees, who were active long before
the large-scale R & D laboratories of the twentieth century. The means computed over20
patentees(patents) indicate that those who assigned their patent to a company at issue received
30.0 (35.9) patents over their careers on average, whereas those who did not assign, those who
assigned away only a share of their patent, and those who made full assignments to individuals
were granted 8.0 (20.0), 5.4 (19.3), and 5.3 (27.3) patents respectively. The average lengths of
career spanned 25.5 (26.6) years for patentees assigning to companies, as opposed to 13.2
(21.5), 10.6 (20.7), and 12.0 (26.1) years respectively for the other three groups of patentees.
The findings that inventors who assigned away their patent rights to companies were more
specialized and productive at invention over their careers holds across different cohorts,
measures, and weighting schemes, and thus provides support to the idea that the evolution of
the market for technology encouraged the emergence of a class of highly productive inventors
who relied on the sale of their patents to extract the returns to their efforts.
Patentees making full assignments at issue to individuals were more productive at
invention than their counterparts who either didn't assign their patents at issue or only assigned
away a share of their rights to individuals. Because their decisions to sell off all of the their
rights suggest that they too were relatively specialized at inventive activity, this class of
patentees is an analytically important group, in that they allow us to distinguish the
characteristics of inventors who sold off their patents in full to individuals from those who
made full assignments to companies —asignificant distinction for those who question whether
assignments at issue from patentees to companies were typically conducted at arm's length.
When the comparisons are based on means computed over all patents (lower panel), or on the
overall average of individual patentees (pooling all three cohorts), inventors who sold off their
rights entirely to individual assignees do indeed seem to have been more specialized and
productive at patenting over their careers. The results are not robust to the within-cohort2
meansreported in the upper panel, but given the small number of individual inventors who
made full assignments to individuals (7, 6, and 6 in the three cohorts respectively), these
estimates, based on one patent per inventor, may not be meaningful.
In general, the small number of observations in some cells might make one cautious in
drawing firm conclusions, and especially about changes over time. Nevertheless, the results
overall, including the differences in the means and distributions of observations between the
two panels, seem to suggest that there were two rather sharply differentiated classes of
inventors. The first was composed primarily of individuals who tended to retain control of the
relatively few patents they received over a rather short careers at invention. These occasional
inventors had little involvement with the market for technology. The other class of inventors,
in contrast, had careers that were largely shaped by the market. They assigned away a high
proportion of their inventions, to either companies or individuals, and were quite focused on
generating patented inventions —receivingmany patents over careers at invention that extended
over several decades. Most prolific patentees fell into this second category, and it would seem
reasonable to argue on the basis of these data that the market for technology played a central
role in the processes and organization of inventive activity during this era.
Multivariate analysis allows us to examine these patterns more carefully, by controlling
for other factors that might be expected to be associated with the productivity of an inventor
over time and the length of his career. Table 9 reports the results for two sets of regressions
estimated over all 6057patents,employing the log of each of these measures of specialization
at invention respectively as the dependent variable. The independent variables include dummy
variables for the region of the patentee, the degree of urbanization in the county of his
residence, and for the cohort (or cross-section) that the patentee in the 'B' sample was drawn22
from.The other independent variables are defined as the proportion of career patents that
were assigned fully at issue to individuals other than the patentee, the proportion of career
patents that were assigned at issue to companies, and interaction terms between the variable for
the proportion assigned to companies and the two respective dummy variables for the 1890-91
and 1910-11 cohorts of patentees. The intercept represents a patentee, residing in a rural
county of the Middle Atlantic and drawn from the 1870-7 1 cross-sectional sample.
The regressions provide further substantiation of the patterns noted in the discussion
of the descriptive statistics. Patentees who made full assignments at issue of their patents,
whether to companies or individuals, received many more patents over their careers, assigned
higher proportions of their patents, and had much longer careers than other classes of
patentees. The estimated point coefficients on the proportion of patents assigned to companies
are very large, and the inclusion of interaction terms with the year-cohort dummies indicates
that the strength of these associations (both in terms of size and statistical significance) did not
change all that much over time (cohorts). The implication is that inventors who relied on the
sale of the rights to their patents followed very different career paths from those who retained
the rights to commercialize their inventions themselves (or with partners), and were more likely
to be highly productive at invention over their careers. It is striking that this pattern is already
evident in the 1870-71 cohort, suggesting that this association between trade in patent rights
and high productivity as an inventor likely developed rather early. The coefficients imply that
inventors who assigned to companies typically accounted for more patents, and had slightly
longer careers, than those who made full assignments to individuals, but the differences
between these two classes of patentees pale relative to those that between them and the other
two classes —patenteeswho did not assign or those who assigned away only a share of their23
rights. Whether an inventor used the market for technology to extract the returns to his
inventive effort by making full assignments before issue seems clearly to have been the most
powerful correlate with productivity at patenting over his career.'6
Also of relevance to our general hypothesis are the findings that patentees residing in
urban counties, and especially in counties with cities of 100,000 or more, produced
substantially more patents over their career (and had longer careers, in the latter case) after
controlling for other characteristics. Similarly, patentees residing in the regions with persistently
higher levels of patenting per capita and assignment activity, like New England, the Middle
Atlantic, and the Middle West, had higher numbers of career patents. These patterns are
consistent with the view that the more productive or specialized inventors were attracted to
locations where the market for technology was better developed or especially active. Finally,
the coefficients on the cohort dummies suggest that inventors from the 1890-91 and 1910-11
cohorts were more productive at patenting over their careers, and had longer careers, than
those from the 1870-71 cohort. This is in general consistent with the notion that the increasing
amounts of investment in human capital required to be an effective inventor was leading to
greater specialization at invention over time, but precisely when these measures of long-term
commitment are estimated to peak depends upon the other variables controlled for.
Skeptics might object that the observation that patentees who assigned their patents at
issue to companies received so many more patents on average, and had longer careers, was due
not to inventors using the market for technology to facilitate their specialization at invention,
but rather to their being employees of the companies in question. In such a case, the
16Onesimple way of illustrating this point is to see how the explanatory power of the regressions
increase substantially when the independent variables reflecting the proportions of total patents assigned
(and the proportions assigned in a particular manner) are included.24
appearance of higher productivity of patentees who assigned away the rights totheir inventions
might simply be attributable to firms underwriting the cost of the patent applications, and thus
be misleading about the extent of arm' s-length transactions. Although these is a serious caveat
that deserves careful evaluation, the finding that inventors who made frill assignments to
individuals were also highly productive and had long careers at invention tends to undercut the
force of the objection, because it seems implausible that these individual assignees were long-
term employers of the inventor. That the association between full assignment and specialization
at invention was apparent as early as 1870-71 also makes it difficult to believe that the patterns
was attributable to assignments within firms —betweeninventor-employees and employers.
Moreover, in other work, we carried out a rather extensive investigation of the relationships
between the patentees in the 'B' sample and their assignees, drawing on information retrieved
about their places of work and job titles, and found that the most highly productive inventors
were generally not employees of the companies they assigned their patent rightsto.'7 Instead
this class of inventors behaved entrepreneurially, selling their patents to different assignees, and
to firms other than their employers. It was not until the turn of the twentieth century, that the
nature of the market for technology began to change again, with a decrease in the proportion
of arm' s-length transactions and a corresponding increase in the assignments made at issue by
patentees who were officers or other principals in the companies specified as assignees.This
decline during the early decades of the twentieth century in the independence of the most
productive inventors from the companies to which they assigned their patents is an extremely
interesting phenomenon. Why the change occurred is not yet clear, but it does not negate our
'Wereport on this investigation in Lamoreaux and Sokoloff, "Inventors, Firms, and Markets".25
findingthat the market for technology had supported the rise of an important class of highly
specialized independent inventors long before the spread of large-scale R & D laboratories.
In summary, the analysis of how the productivity at patenting and other
characteristics of inventors varied with their use of the market for technology contributed
strong, if circumstantial, support for our argument that the development of trade in patent
rights encouraged creative individuals to specialize in invention, with positive
consequences for the pace of technological change more generally. In the next sectionof
the paper we explore the evolution of a set of institutions that was central to this trade —
intermediaries—andexamine whether the patterns of services they provided are consistent
with our interpretation. If the ability to extract returns from invention by selling off patent
rights was crucial to the organization of highly productive inventors, then one would
expect such individuals to be disproportionately associated with intermediaries who were
more specialized at trading in the market for technology and more effective at carrying out
transactions (or making deals) therein.
Iv
Although patentees, assignees, or essentially anyone could act as a middleman in
organizing the sale of a patent, there is reason to believe that the efficiency of such
exchanges improved over time as intermediaries who were relatively specialized in
particular segments of the market for technology emerged. Judging from the records of
the assignments filed with the Patent Office, inventors had already begun to employ
intermediaries by the 1 840s, when multiple assignments of a single patent to distinct
geographic areas were a common practice. These intermediaries were most often local26
attorneys or businessmen who knew what kinds of patents were likely to be salable in their
districts. As assignments became national in scope, however, other means of marketing
patents had to be developed. Moreover, the relations between patentees, assignees, and
intermediaries also had to change as inventive activity became more and more costly and
the province of increasingly specialized individuals. Agents in outlying areas were no
longer very useful. Patentees now needed intermediaries who were able to tap into
networks of businessmen and firms operating in national markets, provide them with
information about what types of inventions were in demand, and help them raise capital to
support their inventive activity. Alternatively, patentees or assignees could play the role of
intermediary themselves. Although many did, there were problems with this approach.
Not only was marketing or searching for a patented invention resource-consuming
(distracting inventors, say, from more creative tasks in which they presumably had a
comparative advantage), but such part-time agents were probably less efficient at
intermediation than specialized agents because of scale economies associated with
investment in information acquisition and reputation building.'8
Indeed, over time, the role of intermediary came increasingly to be played by
patent agents and lawyers. The ostensible function of these specialists was, of course, to
help inventors navigate through the Patent Office's application process and, in the case of
lawyers, to defend their clients' patents in interference and infringement proceedings. In
the course of their business, however, patent agents and lawyers obtained a great deal of
information about participants on both sides of the market for technology. Buyers used
18Amore comprehensive discussion of the issues related to the organization of intermediation is
provided in Naomi R. Lamoreaux and Kenneth L. Sokoloff, "Intermediaries in the U.S. Market for
Technology, 1870-1920," working paper, 1999.27
them for assistance in evaluating the merits of inventions they were interested in
purchasing, and through repeat dealings with such customers, these specialists obtained a
great deal of information about the kinds of patents firms were interested in buying as well
as personal insight into the character of the people involved. Inventors used patent agents
and lawyers to file applications, giving them advance information about technologies about
to be patented. In addition, inventors frequently developed long-term relationships with
their patent agents that encouraged them to try out new ideas on these specialists.'9
In theory, intermediaries specialized in the market for technology should have
lowered costs in trading patents and expanded the extent of this market. In so doing, the
growth of these intermediaries would accordingly stimulate a greater commitment of
resources to inventive activity by inventors and by society at large. If this hypothesis were
correct, however, and there were fixed costs to an inventor and specialized agent
establishing a relationship (such as becoming familiar with each other's work), then one
would expect that the patentees dealing with specialized agents would be more productive
over time than those utilizing other kinds of intermediation, and conversely that the
specialized agents would disproportionately be dealing with the most specialized and
productive inventors. This pattern of matching would arise because the more specialized
inventors would have more to gain from selling his patents through a more efficient or
19Forexample, when Joseph Arbes, a fur manufucturer in New York City who also invented
sewing machines, came up with an idea for a blind stitching machine that would use a flat sided needle,
he immediately dispatched a sketch of the needle to his patent attorney, William E. Knight, for a
judgment as to its potential patentability. He had not even experimented with the needle on a sewing
machine at that point, and both the casualness with which he made the request and the primitive state of
his invention at that time suggest that he had an ongoing relationship with his attorney, who acted in part
as a sounding board for his ideas. See Lamoreaux and Sokoloff, "Intermediaries".28
lower-costintermediary, and such specialized intermediaries would seek out clients who
would bring them a lot of valuable business.
The rise of specialized intermediaries in the trade in patents is but one, albeit
fundamental, aspect of the development of the market for technology over the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It is one, however, whose effects can be
systematically studied by using information on the assignment contracts registered with the
Patent Office. Clerks in that office maintained a chronologically-organized registry that
included the full texts of the assignment contracts. They also kept a Digest (also
organized chronologically but in separate sets of volumes distinguished by the first letter
of the surname of the patentees in the registry), which included a summary of the basic
details of each assignment as well as the name and address of the "correspondent" to
which all correspondence from the Patent Office was to be addressed. We believe that
these correspondents were not only primarily responsible for the performance of the legal
tasks associated with drawing up and maintaining the records for their assignment
contract, but often served as intermediaries between the buyers and sellers.2°
We constructed a sample from this source by collecting the information on all of
the assignment contracts filed with the Patent Office during the first three months of 1871,
1891, and 1911 for patents whose inventors had surnames beginning with the letter 'B.'
Because some of the contracts covered more than one patent, we sometimes focus on the
individual patent assigned as the unit of analysis, and sometimes on the individual
assignment contract. Overall, the sample encompasses 286 contracts (involving 437
patents) from 1871; 423 contracts (858 patents) from 1891, and 614 contracts (88029
patents) from 1911.21Inorder to more fully examine how the type and characteristics of
patent assignments varied across different kinds of inventors, we retrieved for each of the
assigned patents in our sample, a five-year history of all patents received and assigned (at
issue) by the respective patentee, using the year the assigned patent was granted as the
mid-year (thus, we looked two years back, and two forward, from the base year).
Each assignment contract (and the patents it included) were categorized by the
identity of the respective correspondent. Working with lists of patent agents and lawyers
from 1883 and 1905, we distinguished correspondents (generally individuals, rather than
firms) who were formally registered with the Patent Office in at least one of these two
years as a separate (and likely the most specialized on average) class of intermediaries.
Correspondents who were either the patentee, the assignor, or assignee of the patent
specified in the contract were grouped together in a second category of intermediaries. A
third category consisted of third parties who did not appear on either of the two lists of
registered agents we relied on, but it seems likely that some of the correspondents so
classified would have been identified as registered patent agents if we had rosters for more
years. Finally, the 'unknown' category of correspondents includes those cases where no
correspondent was listed in the Digest. These cases were almost entirely due to the patent
in question being assigned together with a patent issued to an inventor whose surname
began with a letter other than 'B'.
20Aswill be evident from the data presented below, a substantial and increasing proportion of
the correspondents were registered with the Patent Office as patent agents or lawyers.
21Ouranalysis treats as contracts cases where a single contract assigned multiple patents from
the same assignor to the same assignee, as well as instances in which several assignments dealing with the
same patent were evidently signed and filed with the Patent Office at the same time. Hence, assignments
filed together in which patentee Smith assigned his patent to Jones in the first one, and then Jones
assigned to Bums in a second assignment, were treated as falling under the same contract.30
In Table 10 we present descriptive statistics computed over the assignment
contracts for each of the correspondent classes in 1871, 1891, and 1911. As is
immediately evident, the relative prominence of registered patent agents in the trade of
patent rights increased over time. They served as correspondents for 26.1 (29.7) percent
of the patents (contracts) assigned in 1871, with their shares increasing to 42.7 (51.8)
percent in 1891, and to 55.7 (58.1) percent respectively in 1911.Another way of gauging
the changing composition of correspondents is to focus on the continuous decline in the
proportion of patent assignments mediated by one of the principals (patentees, assignors,
or assignees)—from 33.0 (33.9) in 1871 to 11.2 (9.5) percent in 1911. It is clearfrom
these figures that third-party intermediaries were already dominant in this market for
patented technologies by 1871, and that the share of the trade carried out through
relatively specialized agents increased over time.
That registered agents were indeed relatively specialized intermediaries is indicated
by the higher numbers of assignment contracts they handled, as compared to the recordof
correspondents inthe other categories. For example, in 1871 the average registered agent
served as the correspondent on 2.36 of the contracts included in our sample, whereas the
averages for principals and unregistered third parties are 1.05and 1.26 respectively. These
figures, of course, greatly underestimate the total number of assignments handled annually
by the correspondents, as they are based on only a small subset of all contracts (3 months
of assignments for patents whose patentees had surnames beginning with the letter 'B').22
The use of registered patent agents was especially prevalent in those segments of
the trade in patents where greater effort or specialization by intermediaries would seem
22Patenteeswhose surnames began with 'B' accounted for roughly 11 percent of all patents.31
likely to have been beneficial, if not essential. One example is that registered agents were
much more likely to have been involved in assignment contracts made before the issuance
of the patent, which required involvement at an earlier and more delicate stage of inventive
activity, than were other types of correspondents. In 1871, 61 percent of the assignment
contracts handled by registered agents were entered into before issue, as opposed to 8 and
23 percent respectively for those where the correspondents were principals or other third
parties.23 This stark difference implies that registered agents were indeed providing a
higher quality of intermediary service, one that we normally associate with better
developed markets —saleswere being effected earlier or more quickly. Another reflection
of registered agents being more specialized than other intermediaries is their greater
orientation toward the more extensive (national) market, and less involved with
assignments pertaining to a specific geographic area. As early as 1871, fully 89 percent
of the contracts for which the correspondent was a registered agent were national,
compared to 70 percent for unregistered third parties and 51 percent for principals. Patent
agents were also more likely to be involved in primary, as opposed to secondary,
assignments and were increasingly so over time.24 Finally, while inventions generated by
patentees residing in major metropolitan centers were generally much more likely to be
assigned than those discovered elsewhere, they were especially likely to be handled by
registered agents. Large cities, with their much higher patenting and assignment rates, as
23Thisresult is robust to controlling for whether the assignment was primary or secondary, as
well as for the characteristics of the patentee.
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Althoughwe lack systematic information about the prevalence of licensing, there are many
indications that the volume of licensing increased substantially over time relative to patent assignments.
Since registered agents were generally leaders in developing new forms of contracts, their lower
propensity to handle secondary assignments may be due to a higher propensity to be involved in licensing.
We base our judgment about how progressive registered agents were on their much earlier adoption of32
well as their disproportionate share of very productive inventors, were the hubs of the
market for technology, and the particular prominence of registered agents in sales of
patents conducted there constitutes fttrther evidence that they were a rather distinctive and
more specialized class of intermediaries.
Consistent with what we have argued above, assignments by inventor-employees
to large firms do not seem to play a much of a role in accounting for the growth over time
in, and patterns of, use of patent agents. For example, the reported percentages of the
patent assignments going to companies (as opposed to individuals), show that the trend
over time toward assigning patents to companies accounted for very little of the change in
the composition of correspondents. This inference follows from the rather small
differences between the fraction of patent assignments handled by registered agents that
went to companies (28, 39, and 61 percent in 1871, 1891, and 1911 respectively) and the
fractions of those handled by principals to the assignments (24, 28, and 55percentin the
respective years) as well as by unregistered third parties (20, 48, and 42 percent).
Moreover, the differences we have observed in the characteristics of patentees using
different types of correspondents are robust to controlling for whether the assignments
was made to a company or an individual.
A more direct test of the idea that the rise of specialized intermediaries made a
difference for the organization and levels of inventive activity is to compare those
patentees who used registered agents to intermediate in the sales of their patent rights,
with patentees who either organized their assignments themselves or relied on other
principals (assignors or assignees) to do so. If patent agents did indeed offer some
stylized forms of assignment contracts —formsthat ultimately became nearly universal —thanother types33
advantage in trading patent rights, such as more efficient (higher quality service)
intermediation or lower transactions costs, one would expect that the inventors who
developed relationships with them would be those who were both more specialized at
patenting and more inclined to extract the returns to their efforts by selling off the rights to
their inventions. As Table 10 indicates, such a pattern did develop over time. In 1871, the
average five-year total of patents awarded to patentees whose contracts were handled by
registered agents was roughly similar to the numbers for patentees who had used other
types of correspondents, but the former group did assign a higher fraction of their patents
at issue over those five years. By 1891, however, the more specialized inventors were
clearly disproportionately matched with the more specialized intermediaries. On average,
patentees whose patents were sold by registered agents received 6.61 patents (4.90 if
computed over contracts), as compared to 3.65 (3.43) and 5.80 (5.17) for those whose
patent assignments were arranged by principals or unregistered third parties. They also
had the highest rates of assignment. These contrasts grew even more striking over time.
By 1911, inventors whose patents were assigned through registered agents were again the
most productive or specialized —with6.92 (5.06) patents over five years, as compared to
2.28 (2.04) for those whose patents were assigned by correspondents who were principals.
In summary, the examination of the assignment contract data yields strong
evidence that the rise of registered patent agents reflected the emergence of more
specialized intermediaries in the market for technology, and was indeed associated with
improvements in the quality of intermediation. Although this follows from the obvious
success of registered agents in the competition with other intermediaries, as judged by
of correspondents.34
changes fri their market share over time and higher market share in places with high
inventive activity, their superior services in intermediation are perhaps best illustrated
through how quickly they were able to sell a patent relative to its date of issue. Given that
registered agents provided better intermediation, it is not surprising that the most
productive and specialized inventors came to be highly disproportionately represented
among their inventor clients. Inventors who were specialized at invention and depended
on selling off the rights to their patents to extract the returns to their efforts would
naturally be most concerned with obtaining high quality (or lower cost) intermediation.
The improvement in intermediation, in turn, reinforced the focus of inventors on
generating patentable inventions. Both the association of the more specialized inventors
with the more specialized agents, as well as the greater speed of closing assignment deals
is consistent with the impression that patent agents frequently had long-term relationships
with their major clients such that they could begin the process of matching buyers with
sellers, even before patents were applied for.25
V
Major increases in rates of invention as well as dramatic growth in the relative
importance of highly specialized inventors as generators of new technological knowledge
were among the fundamental changes in the patterns of inventive activity that occurred in
25
Drawingon other sources of evidence, we examine the relationships between patent agents and
their inventor clients in Lamoreaux and Sokoloff, "Intermediaries in the U.S. Market for Technology,"
and fmd that many did maintain long-term associations and were often involved in marketing inventions
well before they were patented. The observations that patentees with historically high patenting and
assignment rates disproportionately dealt with registered agents and made assignments before issue are
also consistent with our view.35
theU.S. during its early stages of economic growth. Although conclusively demonstrating
causality is difficult, we have argued that an active market for technology evolved over the
nineteenth century, and that it played a central role in these developments. Relying on
records pertaining to patents and their sales, we have shown not only that there was a high
volume of trade in patented technologies, but also that such commerce and patenting
activity were closely associated with each other. Indeed, a broad variety of evidence
seems consistent with what theory would suggest, that improvements in the capabilities to
trade in technology would stimulate increases in specialization at invention by those with a
comparative advantage in that activity, as well as increases in rates of invention more
generally.26
One of the most basic tests of our hypothesis was to examine how the pace and
organization of invention varied with trade in patented technologies over time and place.
As we would expect, they grew together during the critical middle third of the nineteenth
century between the 1836 change in the patent law, which strengthened the property rights
of patentees and their assignees, and 1870. Rates of patenting per capita on a national
basis boomed, increasing more than ten times, alongside a proliferation of patent agents,
periodicals focused on inventions, and other institutions conducive to trade in
technology. Moreover, employing several different measures of the extent of this market,
we found that that the patenting rates were highest, and increased the most over time in
regions like New England and the Middle Atlantic, where it was most developed. What
seems to have happened is that the institutions of the market evolved most rapidly in areas
26Itseems quite reasonable to assume in this context here that the demand for patented
inventions is downward-sloping, if not elastic as well. The increase in rates of invention would be
expected to be highly concentrated in those geographic areas with an improved capability to trade patents.36
whererates of invention were high, and the resulting improvements in the capabilities for
trading in patents in turn stimulated higher rates of patenting —bothby resident inventors
as well as those who moved in to take advantage of the greater opportunities available in
such locations. These mutually-reinforcing processes likely contributed to the marked
pattern of geographic persistence in relative levels of inventive activity that extended over
the nineteenth and into the twentieth century.
Another level of tests pertained to the behavior of individual inventors. The logic
of our view that the emergence of the market for technology stimulated increases in
specialization at invention, and in invention overall, suggests that the most productive
inventors would be disproportionate sellers of the rights to their inventions, and that their
relative importance in the generation of inventions would have grown with the
development of the market for technology. The results here were again consistent with
the general hypothesis. Patentees who assigned away the full rights to their patents, and
especially to companies, were more productive at patenting than their counterparts who
did not throughout the period under study. Furthermore, the proportion of patents
accounted for by inventors who were relatively specialized at invention increased sharply
with the expansion of trade in patents and the acceleration of patenting that took place
over the middle third of the nineteenth century. Overall, the evidence seems to indicate
that a substantial group of inventors took advantage of the improving market for
technology to specialize more in the generation of patentable inventions, and that the rise
of these specialized inventors contributed powerfully to the general increase in patenting
per capita. No doubt the enthusiasm with which they embraced this strategy for making
the best of their talents, as well as the changing environment for trading in patents, was37
partially attributable to the greater investments in human capital that were becoming
increasingly necessary for those engaged in inventive activity as technology grew more
complex over time.
Finally, we subjected our interpretation to yet more scrutiny by examining whether
the most productive inventors were the most sensitive to incremental improvements in the
market for technology. If they were indeed particularly specialized at invention, and thus
dependent on trading away the rights to their patents, one would expect them to have been
especially attracted to advances which improved the efficiency of carrying out such
transactions. Although the development of the market for technology encompassed many
distinct changes that are difficult to study with any precision, we sought to test the notion
by examining whether it was the most productive inventors who were most inclined to use
specialized intermediaries like registered patent agents or attorneys in selling off their
patents. The emergence of such intermediaries, though admittedly quite heterogeneous,
could reasonably be considered an institutional change that led to a better articulated and
integrated market for patents, and the observation that they did disproportionately deal
with inventors who produced more patents is consistent with our view.27
The patent system is often celebrated for the stimulus to invention it provides by
granting limited monopoly rights to inventors for the use of their discoveries. Although
this effect is certainly substantial, the strong association of patenting with trade in new
27Somepatent agencies, like Munn and Company, appear to have had a high-volume business,
focusing more on helping large numbers of patentees obtain patents, and less on the time-intensive
marketing of specific inventions. Other agencies, or individual agents, appear to have provided higher
quality service to a smaller number of clients. Although both classes of agents were in some sense
specialized, it is the latter type of intermediary that was probably most likely to be dealing with the highly
specialized and productive inventors. See Lamoreaux and Sokoloff, "Intermediaries in the U.S. Market for
Technology", for an extensive discussion of the activities of specific patent agents.38
technological knowledge over the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, suggests
that its specification of tradable assets in technology was another fundamentally important
way in which the patent system has stimulated inventive activity. In establishing a basis
for extensive trade in the rights to new technological knowledge, the patent system not
only enhanced the potential returns to particular inventions, but also facilitated the
realization of economies to specialization at invention by independent inventors or small
enterprises. Although some have been skeptical of the feasibility or extent of arms-length
transactions of this sort, it is clear that they were very common through the nineteenth
century and that access to, or involvement in, a market for technology had a profound
impact on the patterns of inventive activity. It remains to be determined why the
independence of the most productive inventors appears to have declined during the
twentieth century, at least until recently.28 However, the evidence we have examined
suggests this change in the organization of inventive activity was unlikely to have been due
to high costs in transacting over technology. Other possible explanations, such as
advantages large enterprises may have had in raising capital or improvements in personnel
management which facilitated the realization of economies of specialization by individual
inventors within large firms, seem deserving of investigation.
28
SeeLamoreaux and Sokoloff, "Inventors, Firms, and Markets".TABLE 1
ANNUAL PATENTS RECEIVED PER MILLION RESIDENTS, BY REGION
1840-1911
1840-491850-591860-691870-711890-911910-11
New England 55.5 175.6 483.3 775.8 772.0 534.3
Middle Atlantic 51.7 129.4 332.3 563.4 607.0 488.6
EastNorthCentral 16.6 57.3 210.3 312.3 429.9 442.3
WestNorthCentral 9.5 22.9 95.4 146.5 248.7 272.0
South 5.5 15.5 26.0 85.8 103.1 114.4
West 24.8 164.5 366.7 381.6 458.4
U.S. Average 27.5 91.5 195.7 325.4 360.4 334.2
Notes and Sources: The rates have been computed from cross sectional samples of
patents drawn from the Annual Reports for the Commissioner of Patents for 1870-7 1,
1890-91, and 1910-11, and from information provided in the introduction to the Annual
Report for 1891. The regional classifications are based on those employed by the Census,
except that Maryland, Delaware, and the District of Columbia are included in the Middle
Atlantic for the 1840s, 1850s, and 1860s, but in the South for the later periods.TABLE 2
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ON ASSIGNMENTS MADE BEFORE
AND AFTER ISSUE OF PATENTS
1870-71 1890-91 1910-11
New England
Assignment to Patenting Index 115.1 109.5 132.4
% Assigned After Issue 70.4 31.2 30.1
% Secondary Assignments 26.6 14.8 12.0
% Geographic Assignments 17.1 0.8 0.0
Middle Atlantic
Assignment to Patenting Index 100.7 94.8 116.3
% Assigned After Issue 70.9 44.4 37.9
% Secondary Assignments 33.3 16.4 11.0
% Geographic Assignments 19.1 1.9 0.7
East North Central
Assignment to Patenting Index 96.3 118.1 104.9
% Assigned After Issue 77.7 48.5 32.8
% Secondary Assignments 18.1 18.4 11.8
% Geographic Assignments 34.3 5.7 1.8
West North Central
Assignment to Patenting Index 90.7 110.1 73.5
% Assigned After Issue 77.4 48.6 42.6
%SecondaryAssignments 32.3 19.2 11.0
%Geographic Assignments 41.9 13.0 2.6
South
Assignment to Patenting Index 60.0 68.9 68.0
% Assigned After Issue 74.4 42.3 48.2
%SecondaryAssignments 27.9 11.3 19.1
% Geographic Assignments 20.9 6.2 2.5
West
Assignment to Patenting Index 150.0 67.2 81.5
%Assigned After Issue 59.1 57.4 36.0
% Secondary Assignments 22.7 11.4 10.4
%GeographicAssignments 18.2 7.4 1.2
Total Domestic
Assignment to Patenting Index 100.0 100.0 100.0
% Assigned After Issue 72.3 44.1 36.5
% Secondary Assignments 27.8 16.4 12.0
% Geographic Assignments 22.8 4.6 1.2
Assignments to Patents Ratio 0.83 0.71 0.71
Number of Contracts 794 1,373 1,869
Sources and Notes: Our sample consists of all assignment contracts filed with the Patent Office during the months of January
1871, January 1891, and January 1911. These contracts are recorded inLiber" volumes stored at the National Archives.
There are a total of about 4,600 contracts in our sample. Only those involving assignors that resided in the United States are
included in this table. The assignment to patenting index is based on the ratio of assignments originating in the respective
regions (given by the residence of the assignor) to the number ofpatents filed from that region in 1870, 1890, and 1910
respectively. In each year the index has been set so that the national average equals 100. The percentage of secondary
assignments refers to the proportion of assignments where the assignor was neither the patentee nor a relative of the patentee.
The percentage of geographic patent assignments refers to the proportion of assignments where the right transferred was for a
geographic unit smaller than the nation.TABLE 3
ASSIGNMENT OF PATENTS BY REGION, 1870-1911
1870-71 1890-91 1910-11
New England
% of Patents Assigned 26.5 (340) 40.8 (321) 50.0 (264)
% of Assignments to Company 33.3 56.5 75.0
%ofAssignmentstoGroupthat 48.9 32.1 14.4
Includes Patentee
Middle Atlantic
% of Patents Assigned 20.6 (645) 29.1 (669) 36.1 (710)
% of Assignments to Company 22.6 50.8 72.7
% of Assignments to Group that 44.4 35.4 18.8
Includes Patentee
East North Central
% of Patents Assigned 14.7 (340)27.9 (505) 32.3 (660)
% of Assignments to Company 12.0 47.5 68.1
% of Assignments to Group that 70.0 41.1 21.6
Includes Patentee
West North Central
% of Patents Assigned 9.0 (67) 21.8 (202) 17.5 (285)
% of Assignments to Company 0.0 36.4 46.0
% of Assignments to Group that 83.3 56.8 42.0
Includes Patentee
South
% of Patents Assigned 6.4 (140)25.0 (216) 22.7 (322)
% of Assignments to Company 11.1 33.3 34.2
% of Assignments to Group that 77.8 57.4 53.4
Includes Patentee
West
%ofPatents Assigned 0.0 (31) 25.4 (118) 21.4 (271)
% of Assignments to Company — 20.0 41.4
% of Assignments to Group that 73.3 44.8
Includes Patentee
All Patents, Including Foreign
%ofPatentsAssigned 18.5 (1,618)29.1 (2,201)30.5 (2,816)
% of Assignments to Company 23.7 47.2 64.8
% of Assignments to Group that 50.3 40.6 25.2
Includes Patentee
Notes and Sources: These estimates were computed from the three cross-sectional
samples described in the text. The numbers of observations in the respective cells are
reported within parentheses.TABLE 4
GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF PATENT ATTORNEYS, 1883






NewEngland 90 16.6 21.6
Middle Atlantic 195 35.9 46.9
East North Central 104 19.2 25.0
Washington, DC 127 23.4 —
West North Central 13 2.4 3.1
South 7 1.3 1.7
West 7 1.3 1.7
Notes and Sources: U.S. Patent Office, Names and Addresses of Attorneys Practicing
Before the United States Patent Office (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office,
1883). All individual listings receive equal weight, including partnerships. The South
does not include Washington, DC.Table 5






























































































































































































































































Notes and Sources: The estimates were computed from the sample. The observations are classified by geographic area:
countieswith no city of 25,000residents or larger; counties with the largest city between 25,000 and 100,000; counties with
the largest city between 100,000 and250,000;andcounties with more than 250,000 in thelargest city.TABLE 6
DISTRIBUTION OF PATENTS BY PATENTEE COMMITMENT TO
PATENTING, 1790-1930
66
Number of "Career" Patents by Patentee
1 Patent 2 Patents 3 Patents 4-5 Patents6-9 Patents10+ Patents







51.0 19.0 12.0 7.6 7.0 3.5
57.5 17.4 7.1 7.6 5.5 4.9
57.4 16.5 8.1 8.0 5.6 4.4
21.1 12.5 9.9 15.8 11.8 28.9
19.5 10.3 10.3 10.3 13.8 35.9
33.2 14.3 8.2 9.8 9.4 25.0
Sources and Notes: The figures from 1790 to 1842 are drawn from Kenneth L. Sokoloff and B. Zorina
Khan, "The Democratization of Invention During Early Industrialization: Evidence from the United
States, 1790-1846," Journal of Economic History, 50 (June 1990), Pp. 363-78. The figures for the latter
years were computed from a longitudinal data set constructed by selecting all the patentees in the cross-
sectional samples (see Table 2 for a description) whose family names began with the letter "B" and
collecting information on the patents they received during the twenty-five years before and after they
appeared in the samples. This data set contains information on 6057 patents granted to the 561 "B"
inventors.TahIe7
REGRESSIONSWITH NUMBER OF PATENTS AWAEJ ED TO THE PATENTEE
AS THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE
Region of Patentee:
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Notes andSources:The dependent variable is the log of the number of patents awarded to the patentee in the year in
question. The intercept reflects the record of a patentee responsible for an unassigned agricultural/food processing
patent from a rural county in the East North Central region. See the note to Table 10.TABLE 8
DESCRIPTIVESTATISTICS ON THE CAREERS OF PATENTEES
IN THE "B" SAMPLE
1870-71 1890-91 1910-11 Total
Means Computed Over Patentees
Not Assigned at Issue
Ave. No. of Patents 8.0 10.0 6.4 7.9
LengthofCareer(Yrs.) 13.2 14.7 11.1 12.7
CareerAssign.Rate(%) 8.3 11.5 9.2 9.6
Number of Patentees 121 117 178 416
Percent of All Patentees 84.6 63.9 75.7 74.2
Share Assignment
Ave.No.ofPatents 5.4 11.1 2.6 6.9
Length of Career (Yrs.) 10.6 13.5 8.1 11.0
Career Assign. Rate (%) 67.1 75.3 87.5 76.7
Number of Patentees 13 19 14 46
Percent of All Patentees 9.1 10.4 6.0 8.2
Full Assign. to Individual
Ave.No.ofPatents 5.3 29.0 3.0 12.1
LengthofCareer(Yrs.) 12.0 18.3 5.3 11.9
Career Assign. Rate (%) 52.1 74.1 76.4 66.7
Number of Patentees 7 6 6 19
Percent of All Patentees 4.9 3.3 2.6 3.4
Full Assign. to Company
Ave. No. of Patents 30.0 23.7 32.6 28.0
LengthofCareer(Yrs.) 25.5 21.7 23.5 22.6
Career Assign. Rate (%) 62.1 70.7 80.9 75.2
Number of Patentees 2 41 37 80
Percent of All Patentees 1.4 22.4 15.7 14.3TABLE 8 cont.
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ON THE CAREERS OF PATENTEES
IN THE "B" SAMPLE
1870-71 1890-91 1910-11 Total
Means Computed Over Patents
Not Assigned at Issue
Ave. No. of Patents 20.0 39.7 38.2 33.7
LengthofCareer(Yrs.) 21.5 28.2 26.0 25.6
Career Assign. Rate (%) 14.2 23.5 22.0 20.4
Number of Patents 900 1264 1053 3217
PercentofAllPatents 80.0 50.1 43.8 53.1
ShareAssignment
Ave. No. of Patents 19.3 40.5 24.4 30.7
Lengthof Career (Yrs.) 20.7 27.5 25.6 25.4
CareerAssign.Rate(%) 39.9 66.5 62.8 59.4
Number of Patents 75 156 108 339
Percent of All Patents 6.6 6.2 4.5 5.6
Full Assign. to Individual
Ave.No. of Patents 27.3 76.5 39.2 58.6
LengthofCareer(Yrs.) 26.1 30.6 28.3 29.2
CareerAssign. Rate (%) 40.3 77.0 70.9 67.9
Numberof Patents 82 224 74 381
PercentofAilPatents 7.3 8.9 3.1 6.2
Full Assign. to Company
Ave. No. of Patents 35.9 62.5 135.6 101.8
Lengthof Career (Yrs.) 26.6 32.9 35.1 33.9
CareerAssign.Rate(%) 53.3 78.0 85.5 81.3
Number of Patents 73 880 1168 2121
Percent of AllPatents 6.5 34.9 48.6 35.0TABLE 9
REGRESSIONS WITH CAREER TOTAL OF PATENTS AND LENGTH OF CAREER
AS THE DEPENDENT VARIABLES
Log of Number of Log of Years from First to
Career Patents Last Patent Plus One
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 2.311 2.2742.2672.8242.8112.808
(0.05)(0.04)(0.04)(0.03)(0.03)(0.03)
Prop. of Career Patents 0.370 1.0270.9570.1110.326 0.301
Assigned Fully to (0.11)(0.10)(0.10)(0.07)(0.07)(0.07)
Individuals at Issue
Prop. Assigned Fully to 1.854 1.774 0.6050.605



















Metropolitan Center 0.474 0.23 80.2270.1470.0700.067
(0.05)(0.04)(0.04)(0.03)(0.03)(0.03)




N 6057 6057 6057 6057 6057 6057
R2 0.19 0.38 0.39 0.08 0.14 0.15
Notes and Sources. These regressions were estimated over all of the individual patent
observations contained in our "B" sample. This sample was collected by gathering
information on all of the patents filed over fifty years by 561 patentees randomly drawn
from cross-sections for 1870-71, 1890-91, and 1910-11. The variables pertaining to
behavior over the careers of the patentees were calculated from the fifty-year totals for
the respective inventors. The constant refers to a patent received by a resident of a
county in the Middle Atlantic without a city of 25,000 or more inhabitants. Urban
counties had cities of greater than 25,000, and metropolitan centers had cities of greater
than 100,000. This patentee was sampled from the 1870-71 cross-section, and his record
of patenting was compiled by searching the previous twenty-five years and the next
twenty-five years. The regression coefficients are reported with standard errors in
parentheses.TABLE 10
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ON PATENT ASSIGNMENT,




1871 Agent AssigneeRegistered Unknown
Number Patents 114 144 126 53
Contracts 85 98 82 21
%ofTotalNumber Patents 26.1 33.0 28.8 12.1
Contracts 29.7 33.9 29.4 7.0
Proportion Assigned Patents 0.47 0.09 0.18
Before Issue Contracts 0.61 0.08 0.23
Proportion SecondaryPatents 0.35 0.33 0.32 0.85
Assignments Contracts 0.20 0.31 0.30 0.80
Proportion National Patents 0.89 0.53 0.71
Assignments Contracts 0.89 0.51 0.70
Proportion Assigned Patents 0.28 0.24 0.20 0.66
to Company Contracts 0.25 0.16 0.20 0.48
Prop. Where PatenteePatents 0.46 0.28 0.40 0.32
inCounty With Contracts 0.39 0.31 0.35 0.38
City of >100,000
Patentees' Ave. 5-Yr.Patents 3.90 3.73 3.35 4.69
Total of Patents Contracts 2.45 3.10 3.27 3.05
Patentees' Ave. 5-Yr.Patents 1.47 0.88 0.80 0.88
Total of Patents Contracts 1.08 0.64 0.88 0.70
Assigned at Issue
Ave. No. of Contracts
Assigned by Contracts 2.36 1.05 1.26
CorrespondentTABLE lOcont.
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ON PATENT ASSIGNMENT,




1891 Agent AssigneeRegistered Unknown
Number Patents 336 188 235 69
Contracts 219 89 88 27
%ofTotalNumber Patents 42.7 21.9 27.4 8.0
Contracts 51.8 21.0 20.8 6.4
Proportion Assigned Patents 0.44 0.15 0.32 0.24
Before Issue Contracts 0.52 0.18 0.40 0.37
Proportion SecondaryPatents 0.20 0.31 0.37 0.81
Assignments Contracts 0.13 0.25 0.23 0.78
Proportion National Patents 0.91 0.78 0.86
Assignments Contracts 0.94 0.72 0.78
Proportion Assigned Patents 0.39 0.28 0.48 0.68
to Company Contracts 0.41 0.27 0.45 0.52
Prop. WherePatenteePatents 0.51 0.45 0.55 0.58
in County With Contracts 0.46 0.45 0.48 0.52
City of >100,000
Patentees' Ave. 5-Yr.Patents 6.61 3.65 5.80 5.45
Total of Patents Contracts 4.90 3.43 5.17 3.00
Patentees' Ave. 5-Yr.Patents 4.29 1.10 3.50 3.65
Total of Patents Contracts 3.39 1.27 3.43 1.74
Assigned at Issue
Ave. No. of Contracts
Assigned by Contracts 1.77 1.07 1.24
Correspondent
I11CUvy '.OIIL1tt.L I. IL !.U' I.L'fincludes information on all such patent assignments filed with the Patent Office during
the months of January through March for 1871, 1891, and 1911. Because some contracts
involved the sale or transfer of more than one patent, and some encompassed multiple
transfers of the same patent (such as the sale of a patent from A to B, and then another
transfer of the patent from B to C), we report one set of figures computed over all patents
assigned and another set computed over all contracts. For every patent in our sampleof
assignments, we compiled a five-year record of all of the patents received bythe
patentee, using the year of the assigned patent as the central year.From this record, we
computed the total number of patents the patentee received over the five yearsand the
total number of these patents that he assigned at issue. We categorized each assignment
contract (and the patents it included) by the identity of the person to whom all
correspondence about the assignments was to be addressed. Working with listsof patent
agents and lawyers from 1883 and 1905, we distinguished correspondentswho were
formally registered with the Patent Office in at least one of these two years as a separate
class of intermediaries. Correspondents who were principals to the contract (either the
patentee, the assignor, or the assignee of one of the patents involved) were grouped
together in a second category of intermediaries. A third category consisted ofthird parties
who did not appear on either of the two lists of registered agents that we relied upon. It
seems likely, however, that we would have been able to identify someof these
correspondents as registered agents if we had rosters for additional years. Finally, we
include an "unknown" category that is primarily composed of cases where multiple
patents were assigned together and where the details of the contract weresummarized in
the record of another patentee whose family name began with a letter other than "B"—
and was thus in another Digest volume.